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CASE SUMMARIES - FALL 1993

TRADEMARK
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PROPERTIES, ET AL. V. SED NON OLET

DENARIOUS, LTD., 817 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

Major League Properties and the Los Angeles Dodgers
("L.A.") sued in equity for trademark infringement against defendant restaurant owners ("Brooklyn") for misappropriating the
Brooklyn Dodgers trademark claimed by L.A.. In 1988, Brooklyn
began operating restaurants exclusively in the Brooklyn borough of
New York City which bore the name "The Brooklyn Dodger." After finding no restaurant or bar with such a service mark, Brooklyn
registered the name with the office of Patents and Trademarks.
Brooklyn also notified L.A. that they were going to use this mark.
L.A. had ceased to use this mark in 1958 when it moved its baseball club from Brooklyn to Los Angeles. It resumed nationwide use
of the mark in 1981 in limited form, licensing the mark, "Brooklyn
Dodgers" to sportswear manufacturers and novelty item producers.
Otherwise, it had licensed limited use of the mark to, inter alia,
Dodger stadium hot dog concessionaires and to two restaurant
owners, to the extent that they displayed memorabilia of both the
Brooklyn and Los Angeles Dodgers. In 1989, after Brooklyn had
made a considerable investment in their enterprise, and after L.A.
had been on notice for a full nine months, L.A. demanded that
Brooklyn cease and desist from use of the "Brooklyn Dodger"
trademark. Brooklyn ultimately refused to do so, and this litigation followed.
Held: The court denied L.A. claim of infringement because
L.A. had failed to prove the test in equity of the likelihood of confusion between its mark and Brooklyn's mark, and that in any
event, L.A. had abandoned the "Brooklyn Dodger" trademark and
stood on equal footing with Brooklyn as to its use. Using the eight
part test set out is the Polarad case, the court held that although
the two marks at issue bore great similarity, other factors, such as
the disparity in services offered by the two parties, the lack of
L.A.'s intent to enter the restaurant business, the sophistication
and lack of actual confusion on the part of Brooklyn's customers,
and the good faith effort of Brooklyn to ensure that no one else
was using the mark in the restaurant business compelled a judgment denying L.A. its infringement claim. The court also held that
under the Lanham Act, non-use of a trademark or servicemark is
prima facie evidence of abandonment of that mark, and that L.A.
failed to rebut that presumption. The court, however, refused to
deny L.A. its trademark rights to the "Brooklyn Dodger" mark in
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the clothing and novelty industry, but limited those rights in favor
of Brooklyn's rights in their Brooklyn-based restaurants.
S.W.

FIRST AMENDMENT - FORFEITURE
ALEXANDER V. UNITED STATES,

113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).

Ferris J. Alexander, Sr. ("Alexander"), petitioner, appeals an
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision which ordered him to forfeit his business and almost nine million dollars he acquired
through racketeering activity. Alexander was in the "adult entertainment business," selling and renting sexually explicit material. He received these materials at a warehouse in Minnesota and
then distributed his products through various retail stores in several Minnesota cities. In 1989, Alexander was charged in a fortyone count indictment which alleged both obscenity and RICO violations. After a four month jury trial, Alexander was convicted of
seventeen obscenity offenses and three RICO offenses, predicated
on the obscenity convictions. The District Court imposed a prison
term and fine on Alexander, and ordered him to forfeit his business assets. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Forfeiture was a permissible punishment for Alexander
and did not violate his First Amendment rights. The Court dismissed Alexander's argument that the forfeiture constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, since the term prior restraint pertains to court orders that actually forbid expressive
activity before the communication occurs. The Court characterized
the forfeiture order as merely depriving Alexander of assets derived from his prior racketeering activity, and not a prevention
from engaging in expressive activity. Furthermore, the Court found
Alexander's argument overbroad and inapposite since the RICO
statute does not criminalize constitutionally protected speech. The
Court of Appeals, however, should have determined whether
RICO's forfeiture provisions resulted in an excessive penalty
within the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause, restricting
the government's power to demand payment as punishment for a
criminal act. Vacated and remanded.
R.C.
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol11/iss1/12

2

